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NOTES

THE LONG, STRANGE TRIP OF WILLFUL AND
WANTON MISCONDUCT AND A
PROPOSAL TO CLARIFY THE
DOCTRINE
A HYPOTHETICAL
Nick Niagara,' a former construction worker, takes great pride
in repairing his house by himself. One day, he stacked a large pile
of bricks in his driveway. Nick planned to use the bricks to repair
holes and cracks in his garage masonry. He posted no warnings on
or near the pile of bricks. Nick's sixteen-year-old neighbor, Sam
Clumsy, came to chat with Nick and attempted to climb on the
bricks. With a thunderous crash, the bricks came tumbling down,
injuring Clumsy.
After Clumsy received hospital treatment, his parents filed a
lawsuit against Nick. A short time after the close of discovery,
Clumsy's attorney, with leave from the trial judge, added a count
charging Nick with willful and wanton misconduct.
At trial,
Clumsy presented evidence of Nick's negligence. Likewise, Nick
presented evidence of Clumsy's negligence which contributed to the
accident. The jury returned a verdict finding Clumsy ninety percent negligent and Nick ten percent negligent. Nick, having been
instructed on the principles of modified comparative negligence,
breathed a sigh of relief. His comfort was short-lived, however, as
the jury also found Nick guilty of willful and wanton misconduct in
stacking the bricks without posting a warning.
Illinois tort law2 currently assesses damages according to a sys1. All names used in this hypothetical are fictional.
2. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 593 N.E.2d 522
(1992). The Burke case forms the centerpiece of this Note. In Burke, the plaintiff sued a store manager, the City of Chicago, and several police officers for the
paralyzing injuries the plaintiff sustained during a scuffle over a case of cola
and a subsequent arrest arising from that confrontation. Id. at 434-36, 593
N.E.2d at 524. The plaintiff and the store manager argued over the case of cola
and the store manager shoved the plaintiff, causing him to trip on loose tiles,
fall, and lose consciousness. Id. at 434-36, 593 N.E.2d at 524. The plaintiff
regained consciousness when several police officers arrived to arrest him. Id. at
434-36, 593 N.E.2d at 524. Even though the plaintiff informed the officers that
he was injured and unable to move, the officers dragged the plaintiff to the
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tern known as modified comparative negligence.3 Modified comparative negligence determines damages by weighing the plaintiff's
degree of fault against the defendant's degree of fault.4 The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's responsibility for the injury
equalled or surpassed his own in order to recover.5 If the plaintiff
meets this threshold, then he can recover the percentage of damages attributable to the defendant's fault.6 However, Illinois law
denies a civil defendant found guilty of willful and wanton misconpaddy wagon. Id. at 434-36, 593 N.E.2d at 524. The plaintiff suffered further
injuries in a series of falls. Id at 434-36, 593 N.E.2d at 524. The trial court found
that all of the incidents combined to cause the single indivisible injury of
quadriplegia. Id at 439, 593 N.E.2d at 526. The jury determined that the police
officers were willful and wanton when they injured the plaintiff. Id at 435, 593
N.E.2d at 524. In addition, the jury found the plaintiff responsible for 32% of his
own injury. Id. at 435, 593 N.E.2d at 524. However, the trial court refused to
reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence. Id at
432-33, 593 N.E.2d at 523. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed this ruling in
Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 209 Ill. App. 3d 192, 568 N.E.2d 80 (1st
Dist. 1991). The city then appealed this issue to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Burke, 148 Ill.2d at 433, 593 N.E.2d at 523.
3. Modified comparative negligence is a subsystem of comparative negligence. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 67, at 470-73 (5th ed. 1984). Comparative negligence allows for the reduction
of damages awarded to the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's proportion of fault.
I& at 470-75. Since comparative negligence allows recovery based on fault, commentators consider comparative negligence much fairer than contributory negligence. Id, Contributory negligence denied a plaintiff any recovery if the
plaintiff was responsible for his own injury in any way. Id, § 65, at 451-52.
Two basic forms of comparative negligence exist in American common law
today. I& § 67 at 471-72. These are "pure" and "modified" comparative negligence. Id at 471. The pure form of comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to
recover for his injury, provided he is not completely at fault. Id. at 471-72.
Under the pure form of comparative negligence, if a plaintiff is responsible for
70% of the injury, he may recover 30% of his damages from the defendant. Id.
at 472. The defendant, however, may recover 70% of his damages from the
plaintiff. Id.
Under the modified system, the plaintiff must pass a threshold of liability.
Id. at 473. Typically, the plaintiff must show that his fault is less than or equal
to the defendant's fault. Id.
A third form of comparative negligence, used only in Nebraska and South
Dakota, is the "slight-gross" system. Id. at 474. The slight-gross system allows
the plaintiff to recover full damages from the defendant if the plaintiff was only
slightly negligent and the defendant was grossly negligent by comparison. Id.
See also HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 4:1 at 85 (2d ed. 1987); VICTOR
E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 45-76 (2d ed. 1986).
4. Modified comparative negligence, therefore, is similar to pure comparative negligence. The sole distinguishing factor is the threshold of liability. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 67 at 473.
5. In Illinois, the General Assembly set the threshold of recovery at 50%.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116
(1991)). Therefore, in order for the plaintiff to recover, the defendant's responsibility for the injury must equal or surpass the plaintiff's.
6. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 21116 (1991)).
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duct the benefits of modified comparative negligence. 7 On a scale of
misconduct, willful and wanton misconduct, also known as recklessness, falls somewhere between actual intent and simple negligence. 8 Generally, a willful actor engages in acts that surpass
negligence in egregiousness, but fall short of intentional conduct. 9
In response to what it perceives as deplorable conduct, the Illinois Supreme Court places total liability on a willful and wanton
defendant. 10 As a result, Nick's sense of relief in the above hypothetical was short-lived due to the jury's finding of willful and wanton misconduct. Although Nick's fault was assessed at ten percent,
under Illinois law he remains liable for Clumsy's full damages.
Illinois recently developed this quirk in its tort law when the
Illinois Supreme Court decided Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor
Mart." Burke imposed full liability on a defendant solely on a finding of willful and wanton misconduct, without any consideration for
12
the defendant's true amount of responsibility for the injury.
Therefore, Burke subjects the willful and wanton defendant to the
same unfair treatment that the contributory system imposed on the
slightly negligent plaintiff. 13 To remedy this problem, this Note
proposes that the Illinois General Assembly adopt a system blending the equity-based system of comparative negligence 14 with the
deterrence-oriented system of willful and wanton misconduct.' 5
Part I of this Note outlines the history of negligence law and the
role of willful and wanton misconduct in Illinois. Part II evaluates
the Burke rationale and reveals the decision's inadequacies. Part
III focuses on a decision reached in another jurisdiction to contrast
the methods used to decide the status of willful and wanton misconduct under comparative negligence. Part IV proposes a model stat7. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 451, 593 N.E.2d 522,
532 (1992).
8. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 34, at 212-13.
9. Id. at 213. This egregiousness is sometimes characterized as a "disregard
of the known danger that will inevitably follow." Id. Due to this heightened
degree of culpability, the defendant cannot invoke the plaintiff's contributory
negligence as a shield to the cause of action. Id.
10. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451-52, 593 N.E.2d at 531-32. The Burke court identified a qualitative difference between willful and wanton misconduct and negligence. Id. at 450, 593 N.E.2d at 531. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the
willful actor's "intentional or conscious disregard for the danger" warranted the
imposition of punitive measures to deter similar outrageous acts in the future.

Id. at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
11. 148 Ill. 2d 429, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992).
12. Id. at 451-52, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
13. See inkfra notes 17-18 and accompanying text for a discussion on the operation of contributory negligence.
14. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text for an examination of the
rationales behind the adoption of comparative negligence.
15. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text for a treatment of the history and development of the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine.
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ute for enactment in Illinois and other states. This proposed statute
would equitably resolve the issue by synthesizing the goals and policy considerations of the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine
and the comparative negligence system into a method that handles
these cases in a fair manner for all parties.
I.

EVOLUTION OF NEGLIGENCE LAW

In order to fully understand the role willful and wanton misconduct plays in Illinois negligence law, it is necessary to review the
development of the contributory and comparative negligence systems. Section A analyzes the historical transformation of contributory negligence to comparative negligence, and highlights the
creation of the willful and wanton misconduct exception to contributory negligence. Section B explores the history of Illinois' negligence law from its chaotic early period to the eventual adoption of
comparative negligence. Finally, Section C examines the development of willful and wanton misconduct in Illinois negligence law,
from its inception to the Burke decision.
A.

The Evolution of ComparativeNegligence
from ContributoryNegligence

Comparative negligence arose in response to the inequitable
distribution of damages under contributory negligence. 16 Therefore, to fully appreciate the benefits of comparative negligence, it is
necessary to analyze the history of contributory negligence as well.
This section relates the history of negligence law from the development of contributory negligence to the adoption and refinement of
comparative negligence.
In 1809, the English introduced the contributory negligence
doctrine in the case of Butterfield v. Forrester.17 Contributory neg16. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the origins of comparative negligence.
17. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). In Butterfield, the plaintiff was riding
home from a local alehouse when he struck a pole laid across the road by the
defendant who was making repairs to his house. Id. The court denied recovery
for the defendant's negligent act because the plaintiff, by riding his horse at an
excessive speed, failed to exercise due care for his own safety. Id. at 926-27. The
contributory negligence defense, therefore, precluded the plaintiff's recovery
because the plaintiff's actions added to the injury. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3,
§ 65, at 451-52.
Several theories attempt to explain the rationale underlying the defense,
including voluntary assumption of risk, proximate cause, and deterrence. Id. at
452. However, none of these rationalizations adequately explain the defense.
Id. The deterrence argument fails due to its reliance on the unlikely situation
of a potential plaintiff conducting his affairs while concentrating on the viability of future lawsuits. Id. In addition, opponents of the deterrence argument
point out that contributory negligence is just as likely to promote the defendant's negligent behavior because of the defendant's belief that any liability will
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ligence precluded a plaintiff's recovery if the plaintiff contributed
to his injury in any way.' 8 Several commentators attributed the
doctrine's conception and rapid acceptance to the dawning age of
industrialism, 19 the advent of the railroads, 20 and a desire to prevent juries from awarding excessive verdicts to plaintiffs injured by
the new enterprises. 21 The courts quickly realized that large
awards to injured parties, particularly workers, would soon bankrupt these nascent, yet vital, industries. 22 The desire to safeguard
industry permeated the jurisdictions of the United States as well. 23
As a result, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts adopted the doctrine in the 1824 case of Smith v. Smith. 24 Other American jurisdic25
tions rapidly followed suit.
be negated by the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id. Furthermore, the

proximate cause argument departs from the usual application of proximate
cause. Id. Keeton notes that the use of the proximate cause rule in a contributory negligence case distorts the normal application of the rule by finding an
insular cause despite the simultaneous occurrence of negligence. Id. Finally,
the assumption of risk justification errs on its basic premise. Id. The negligent
plaintiff cannot be said to knowingly assent to the dangers involved in a course
of conduct that has not yet been identified as dangerous. Id.
The actual reasons for the adoption of contributory negligence are found in
the policy decisions underlying the doctrine. Id. The early courts protected the
interests of industry from plaintiff-minded juries prevalent at the time. Id. For
a more detailed discussion of the influences of industry on the adoption of contributory negligence, see infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
18. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 65, at 451.
19. WOODS, supra note 3, § 1:4, at 7-8. Woods attributed the English and
American courts' decision to adopt contributory negligence to a patriotic urge to
protect the vital industries. Id. § 1:4, at 7-10, § 1:5, at 10-11. Woods also noted
that the tone of the decisions adopting contributory negligence suggested the
doctrine was not a wholly new development to judges. Id. § 1:1, at 1-4, § 1:2, at
4-6. In fact, it appeared to Woods that the judges merely granted formal recognition to an existing doctrine. Id.
20. Earnest A. Turk, ComparativeNegligence on the March (pts. 1 & 2), 28
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 304 (1950). Turk, like Woods, acknowledged the protectionist influence of judicial decisions during the industrial revolution. Id. at 198.
21. Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of ContributoryNegligence, 41 ILL.
L. REV. - Nw. UNIV. 151, 158-69 (1946). Malone noted that an individual plaintiff, wounded by a faceless industry, would appear more sympathetic to juries.
Id. at 157-58.
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 67, at 469.
23. Leon Green, Illinois Negligence Law (pts. 1-3), 39 ILL. L. REV. - Nw.
UNIV. 36, 116, 197 (1944). Green attributed the adoption of contributory negligence to domestic courts seeking to protect the new enterprises. Id. at 39.
24. 15 Mass. (1 Pick) 464 (1824). The Smith case followed a fact pattern
similar to that in Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). The
defendant placed a pile of wood in the highway that caused injury to the plaintiff's horse. Smith, 15 Mass. (1 Pick) at 464-65. The plaintiff's servant ran into
the wood when attempting to deliver ale. Id. at 465. The court held that the
plaintiff's failure to use ordinary care for the safety of his property precluded
his recovery. Id. at 467.
25. See, e.g., WOODS, supra note 3, § 1 for a full analysis of the development
and acceptance of contributory negligence; see also Malone, supra note 21, at
151.
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Critics derided contributory negligence because of the mechanics of the doctrine. 26 The doctrine's disregard for the degree of fault
among the parties led to slightly negligent plaintiffs enduring the
past and future costs of damages, while the more culpable defendants completely evaded liability. 27 To counter the inequitable nature of contributory negligence and allow the plaintiff to recover
for his injury, the courts carved out exceptions to the defense such
as the doctrine of willful and wanton misconduct. 28 By adopting
willful and wanton misconduct, courts allowed the plaintiff to recover for injuries, attributable in part to his own negligence, if the
plaintiff could prove that the defendant engaged in willful and wanton misconduct. 29 However, this new exception to the contributory
negligence defense provided relief in only a limited number of
cases.30 In comparison to its later significance, willful and wanton
misconduct played only a slight role in the early development of
3
contributory negligence law. '

By the twentieth century, federal3 2 and state 33 legislation be26. Green, supra note 23, at 36. Dean Green characterized contributory
negligence as "the harshest doctrine known to [man]." Id. Several commentators who followed Green relied on this description in attacking the use of contributory negligence. See, e.g., Turk, supra note 20, at 199-200; Malone, supra
note 21, at 169.
27. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for a discussion on the application and development of the contributory negligence defense.
28. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text for a definition of the willful
and wanton misconduct doctrine. The other main exception to the contributory
negligence defense was the doctrine of last clear chance. Last clear chance
originated in Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (K.B. 1842), where the defendant ran down the plaintiff's jackass which the plaintiff negligently left in the
road. Id. The court found the defendant liable because he had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the collision. Id. at 589. Some jurisdictions required varying
degrees of helplessness on the plaintiff's part before invoking the doctrine.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 66, at 464-68. Keeton believes the last clear
chance doctrine was adopted as a means of mitigating the harsh effects of contributory negligence. Id § 67, at 464.
29. Early courts found that the heightened degree of heedlessness for the
danger involved with a particular course of conduct negated the plaintiff's contributory negligence for the injury. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 65 at 462 n.9.
30. William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 470
(1951). Prosser characterized the doctrine of willful and wanton misconduct as
being of limited importance due to its restricted use. Id.
31. Id. For a full discussion of the influence that willful and wanton misconduct played in Illinois in later years, see infra notes 87 to 120 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
Congress enacted this legislation in 1906 and corrected it in 1908, after the
United States Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in Howard v. Ill.
Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463 (1908). See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). See also WOODS, supra
note 3, §§ 2:1-2:7, at 31-47 for a full analysis of FELA and its effects on negligence law.
33. See, e.g., Structural Work Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 220/9 (1993) (ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 59.90 (1991)); Workers' Compensation Act, 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 305/1 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.1 (1991)); Child La-
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gan sounding the death knell for contributory negligence. Comparative negligence 34 began to replace contributory negligence in
several areas of the law. The doctrine of comparative negligence
existed in various forms in admiralty law for some time. 35 Advocates of comparative negligence viewed its method of apportioning
damages according to fault as a fairer way of dealing with negligent
conduct in a civilized society. 36 Although it met with heavy resistance from the insurance bar, comparative negligence, in one form
37
or another, is now the law in forty-four states, including Illinois.
bor Laws, 820

ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 31.1
(1991)). None of these statutes address fault; they address only the defendant's
compliance with the statute. For an application of the Child Labor Law, see,
e.g., Almanderez v. Keller, 207 Ill. App. 3d 756, 566 N.E.2d 441 (1st Dist. 1990).
34. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text for a definition of comparative negligence.
35. See WOODS, supra note 3, § 3:1, at 49 (providing a detailed history of the
evolution of comparative negligence in admiralty law); see also Prosser, supra
note 30, at 475-76.
36. Turk, supra note 20, at 341. The consideration given to relative fault
among tortfeasors underlies the great support for the doctrine. Id. at 339. The
application of percentages eradicates the unjust situations occurring under contributory negligence where the slightly negligent plaintiff suffers greatly while
the defendant, the more culpable party, completely escapes responsibility. Id.
37. Thirteen states use the pure form of comparative negligence. See Kaatz
v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975), qff'd in part, rev'd in part, 572 P.2d 775
(Alaska 1975); later adopted by the legislature, ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.900 (Supp.
1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4A, §§ 12-2501 to 12-2509 (Supp. 1992); Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973); Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 9, art.
2323 (West Supp. 1992); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638 (Mich. 1979);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983);
Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & RULES § 1411
(Consol. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN., tit. 4,
§ 4.22.005 (West 1988).
Twenty-nine states employ the modified system of comparative negligence.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21111 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132
(Supp. 1992); Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 79 S.E. 836 (1913); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-31 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to 6-806 (1990); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21116 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1991)); IND. CODE § 34-4-33-3
(Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a
(Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 1988); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507.7a (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, §§ 15-5.1 to 15-5.3 (West 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 12, 13 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470
(1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (1982); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.001 (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to 78-27-38 (1992); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W.
Va. 1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988).
Only Nebraska and South Dakota employ a third form of comparative negligence, the slight-gross system. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21105 (1989); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1987); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 67,
at 474 (defining the slight-gross system).

The John Marshall Law Review

B.

[Vol. 26:363

The Development of llinois Negligence Law

The history of negligence law in Illinois is complex and at some
points incomprehensible. Illinois first adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence in 1852.38 Then, in 1858, the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized a form of comparative negligence without expressly overruling contributory negligence. 39 As a result, confusion
40
ensued over the correct application of the two competing systems.
This section explores the development of negligence law in Illinois
from the early period of confusion, to the eventual adoption of comparative negligence.
In the 1852 case of Aurora Branch Railroad v. Grimes,41 the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted the reasoning embraced by the
English judiciary in Butterfield v. Forrester,42 and made contributory negligence part of Illinois law. 43 The Grimes court, however,
incorporated the contributory negligence defense as part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case. 44 Therefore, a plaintiff in Illinois had to
show not only the negligent act of the defendant, but also an absence of negligence on his own part to recover for his injuries under
the Illinois negligence system. 45 Since the mechanics of this system
practically doomed the plaintiff's chances for recovery, many com46
mentators considered the system too harsh.
38. Aurora Branch R.R. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852). See infra notes 41-46
and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Grimes case.
39. Galena & Chicago R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858). See infra notes 4753 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and rationale the court
used to arrive at the Jacobs decision.
40. See Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. v Johnson, 33 Ill. 512 (1882);
Green, supra note 23, at 47-54; Turk, supra note 20, at 307-09. For a discussion
of Johnson, see irnfra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
41. 13 Ill. 585 (1852). In Grimes, the plaintiff's mare fell into a hole on the
defendant's property. Id. at 586. The court held that the plaintiff's failure to
use ordinary care in protecting his property precluded his recovery. Id. at 591.
42. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
43. Grimes, 13 Ill. at 591.
44. Id. Several commentators considered this interpretation to be a minority view that doubly burdened the plaintiff. See, e.g., Green, supra note 23, at
43.
45. Grimes, 13 Ill. at 587. The Illinois Supreme Court alleviated this onerous burden later in the same year. Green, supra note 23, at 44. In Moore v.
Moss, 14 Ill. 106 (1852), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of last
clear chance. See supra note 28 for a definition of last clear chance. The court
in Moore imposed a duty on the defendant to avoid recognizable danger created
by the plaintiff's negligence. Moore, 14 Ill. at 111. The adoption of last clear
chance, however, was not a panacea for the negligent plaintiff. Green, supra
note 23, at 44. Courts limited its use to those cases where the plaintiff could
show that the defendant recognized the danger, but nonetheless proceeded to
act negligently. Id.
46. One commentator characterized the contributory negligence defense as
"the harshest doctrine known to the common law of the nineteenth century."
Green, supra note 23, at 36.
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To reduce the harshness of this system, 47 the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted a new rationale in the 1858 case of Galena & Chicago
Railroad Co. v. Jacobs.48 The Jacobs court allowed the plaintiff to
recover full damages after showing that the defendant railroad engaged in willful and wanton misconduct. 49 The doctrine proposed
by the Jacobs court is similar to the slight-gross system of negligence, which allows a plaintiff full recovery upon a showing that his
negligence was slight in comparison to the defendant's grossly negligent acts. 50 Unlike comparative negligence, the Jacobs doctrine
did not decrease the defendant's liability for damages by the per51
centage of fault attributable to the plaintiff.
The Jacobs decision allowed a slightly negligent plaintiff to recover, yet did not expressly overrule the Grimes decision which
precluded a negligent plaintiff from recovering any damages. 52 As
a result, confusion ensued as the lower courts freely chose either
system in reaching decisions. 53 Over the next thirty years, the Illi54
nois Supreme Court unsuccessfully attempted to clarify Jacobs.
47. Green, supra note 23, at 47. Green attributes this motivation to the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. However, the Jacobs decision lacks any policy statements to support Green's characterization. See Galena & Chicago R.R. v.
Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858).
48. 20 Ill. 478 (1858). This decision may have been motivated by its facts.
The defendant's train hit the plaintiff, a four-year-old boy,.as he crossed an area
of track commonly used by railroad employees. Id at 485. The court, however,
did not find the boy's technical trespass controlling. Id. at 496. Instead, it focused on the relative degrees of negligence of the parties. Id. at 497. From the
approving language the Jacobs court used when citing the Grimes decision, it
appears that the Jacobs court intended for the new holding to be used in conjunction with the Grimes decision. Id.
49. Id. at 496-97.
50. See supra note 3 for a definition of the slight-gross system of negligence.
51. Jacobs, 20 Ill. at 496. One commentator attributes the birth of Illinois
comparative negligence to this case. Green, supra note 23, at 46. Green viewed
this decision as an attempt to eradicate the harshness of contributory negligence and replace it with the more equitable system of comparative negligence.
Id. at 47.
52. Jacobs, 20 Ill. at 488. After citing Grimes with approval, the Jacobs
court then went on to evaluate other precedents to formulate a synthesis of
opinion resulting in the Jacobs doctrine. Id. at 488-97.
53. Green, supra note 23, at 47; Turk, supra note 20, at 307-08. The appellate and trial level courts had the option of applying either Grimes or Jacobs in
their decisions. Id. at 308. Thus, the plaintiff's recovery was based on the
whims of the courts. Id. at 309.
54. In Illinois Central Railroad v. Baches, 55 Ill. 379 (1870), the Illinois
Supreme Court sought to blend the Grimes and Jacobs rationales. The Baches
court held that an injured plaintiff must first show due care on his part. Id. at
390. If the plaintiff failed to meet the burden established in Grimes, then the
plaintiff could only recover by proving that the defendant acted in a grossly
negligent manner. Id. From the language used in Jacobs, as well as the Jacobs
court's refusal to expressly overrule Grimes, it appears that the Baches court
correctly interpreted the Jacobs rationale. However, the court weakened the
Baches two-step compromise approach in Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad v.
Evans, 88 Ill. 63 (1878). In Evans, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
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Despite the Illinois Supreme Court's efforts at clarification, the correct application of the two systems remained confusing. 55 This confusion drew the criticism of the Illinois Supreme Court in Chicago,
Burlington,& Quincy RailroadCo. v. Johnson.5 6 The decision ridiculed the lengths to which "gross" and "slight" negligence could be
taken. 57 The Johnson court noted that the determination of degrees of negligence was relative.58 Eventually, the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized the unwieldy 59 nature of the Jacobs system and
discarded it in City of Lanark v. Dougherty,60 thereby establishing
61
contributory negligence as the law in Illinois.
Nevertheless, the worker's compensation and employer liability statutes on state 62 and federal 63 levels whittled away at the
shield contributory negligence provided to defendants. By the middle of the twentieth century, industry, the original beneficiary of
contributory negligence,64 no longer enjoyed the protection of the
contributory negligence system because new statutes discarded contributory negligence. The individual, however, still labored under
plaintiff had the burden of showing slight or no negligence before he could recover. Id. at 64. After the plaintiff met this burden, the court compared the
parties' degree of fault. Id. at 65. The plaintiff would then recover after proving
that the defendant's negligence was gross in comparison. Id.
55. Green, supra note 23, at 47 (discussing the extent of the confusion in
Illinois appellate and trial courts).
56. 33 Ill. 512 (1882). In Johnson, a speeding train killed the plaintiff's decedent while he was working at a store serviced by the defendant railroad. Id
at 517. Despite the fact that the train was traveling in excess of the city speed
limit, the decedent's contributory negligence was still at issue. Id at 520. The
court, clearly exasperated with the new system of degrees of negligence, called
for changes in the system. Id. at 522-23.
57. Id. at 522.
58. Id. Johnson also pointed out the paradoxical workings of the Jacobs
reasoning, in that both parties neglected to use ordinary care, but one party was
found to be grossly negligent, while the other was found to be only slightly
negligent. Id. at 523. The Johnson court expressed dissatisfaction with this
quirk, since it appeared to reward negligence. Id. at 524.
59. Although most commentators concede that the system was onerous,
some cling to the belief that the courts discarded the Jacobs doctrine for other
reasons, such as a reluctance to burden industry. See, e.g., Green, supra note 23,
at 51.
60. 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894). Dougherty expressly overruled the Jacobs doctrine. Dougherty, 153 Ill. at 165-66, 38 N.E. at 893. The destruction of
the Jacobsdoctrine has also been attributed to two other cases, Calumet Iron &
Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358, 3 N.E. 456 (1885), and Lake Shore and Michigan
Southern Railway Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894). These cases,
however, are more properly labeled as merely narrowing the doctrine. Green,
supra note 23, at 51-54.
61. Dougherty, 153 Ill. at 165-66, 38 N.E. at 893.
62. See supra note 33 for examples of state laws discarding the contributory
negligence doctrine.
63. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988)
(rejecting contributory negligence as a defense).
64. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the influence of industry on the adoption of the contributory negligence doctrine.
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65
contributory negligence's cumbersome burden of proof.

Several members of the Illinois bar launched attacks aimed at
curing this inequity in 1959.66 A judicial conference addressed the
validity of contributory negligence in a modern state.6 7 The conference recommended adoption of comparative negligence. 68 The
majority at the conference considered modified comparative negligence's apportionment of damages according to fault to be a more
just system of imposing liability.

69

Although several conferees staunchly defended the doctrine of
contributory negligence and argued against the adoption of comparative negligence, 70 the Illinois Appellate Court rejected these arguments and recommended that contributory negligence be discarded
in favor of comparative negligence in Maki v. Frelk.71 The Illinois
65. This legacy of industrial interests rankled several commentators. See,
e.g., Green, supra note 23, at 121-25; Turk, supra note 20, at 339-46. Clearly, any
justification for contributory negligence evaporated when the statutory enactments prevented the main beneficiaries from utilizing the defense. Turk, supra
note 20, at 341. With the large number of deaths and injuries precipitated by
the advent of automobiles, the crisis became critical. Prosser, supra note 30, at
466. Advocates for comparative negligence pointed to the horrible consequences of contributory negligence as well as the virtual rejection of the doctrine by juries. Id. at 469.
66. William C. Atten, Should Illinois Adopt a ComparativeNegligence Statute? Yes!, 51 ILL. B.J. 195 (1962). Atten, a supporter of comparative negligence,
reported on the attempts to change Illinois law to comparative negligence. He
pointed to the injustice of allowing the more culpable defendant to escape liability because of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id. at 197. He also noted
the unpredictable tendency of juries to reject the doctrine and return compromise verdicts. Id.
67. Id. at 195. Atten reported on the judicial conference and addressed the
pros and cons of comparative negligence. Id. at 197-99. He recommended the
adoption of modified comparative negligence as the proper method for apportioning liability among parties. Id. at 205.
68. Id. at 205.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., David M. Burrell, Should Illinois Adopt a Comparative Negligence Statute?No!, 51 ILL. B.J. 195 (1962). The one remarkable feature of Burrell's article is that it is completely devoid of footnotes. Burrell instead relies
on ad hominem attacks and self-glamorization to arrive at the conclusion that
contributory negligence works because the juries ignore it. See id. at 207-09.
Some of the arguments put forth by Burrell and other opponents of comparative negligence are that juries, although told that contributory negligence acts
as a bar to recovery, often arrived at compromise verdicts; that litigation would
increase if comparative negligence were to be adopted; and that settlement
would be discouraged under a comparative negligence system. Id. But see Alvis
v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981), where the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed and rejected these arguments.
71. 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (2d Dist. 1967), rev'd, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239
N.E.2d 445 (1968). The plaintiff in Maki brought suit on a theory of comparative negligence. Id. at 440, 229 N.E.2d at 285. The trial court dismissed the
comparative negligence count as having no basis in law. Id. at 440, 229 N.E.2d at
285. The appellate court in Maki, disillusioned by the lack of legislative response, took the initiative and tried to change the law. See id. at 451, 229 N.E.2d
at 290.
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Appellate Court in Maki analyzed the utility of contributory negligence in modern society and found it wanting. 72 The court pointed
out that contributory negligence was originally adopted to safeguard industry, but that those safeguards no longer existed due to
statutory enactments prohibiting contributory negligence as a defense in industrial accidents. 73 As a result, the appellate court in
Maki recommended the approval of a modified form of comparative
negligence in Illinois.7 4 However, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this invitation for change, and stated that it would leave the
adoption of comparative negligence to the legislature. 75
However, thirteen years later, the Illinois Supreme Court
changed its position on both contributory negligence and judicial
abstinence by adopting the pure form of comparative negligence in
Alvis v. Ribar.76 In Alvis, the court weighed the benefits of the
continued use of contributory negligence in a modern society
against the advantages of the fairer system of comparative negli72. Id. at 441, 229 N.E.2d at 286. The Illinois Appellate Court in Maki noted
that modern conditions eliminated the need for the contributory negligence defense. Id. at 452, 229 N.E.2d at 291. Industrial accidents were being handled
under worker's compensation statutes. Id. at 441, 229 N.E.2d at 286. The court
could find no justification for retaining the doctrine when its primary beneficiary, industry, was no longer able to take advantage of it. Id at 449, 229 N.E.2d at
290. These views were by no means unique. They formed the centerpiece arguments in Prosser's article, ComparativeNegligence, supra note 30, at 466.

73. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37, concerning the statutory re-

jection of contributory negligence.
74. Maki, 85 Ill. App. 2d at 451, 229 N.E.2d at 290-91. There the appellate
court reasoned that because the courts created contributory negligence, the
courts could replace it. Id. at 452, 229 N.E.2d at 291.
75. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968). In reaching this
decision, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the theory that contributory negligence could be abandoned by the court solely because the court created it. Id at
196, 239 N.E.2d at 447. The court reasoned that the Illinois Constitution granted
the legislature the sole power to change the law. Id. at 196, 239 N.E.2d at 447.
Justice Ward, in his dissent, wholeheartedly endorsed the appellate court's
attempt to end the inequitable system. Id. at 202-03, 239 N.E.2d at 450 (Ward, J.,
dissenting). He relied on the fact that the court had adopted contributory negligence in Grimes, and believed, therefore, that the court could dispose of it. Id.
at 199-202, 239 N.E.2d at 448-50. Justice Ward also stated that England, the
birthplace of the doctrine, had since discarded it. Id. at 201, 239 N.E.2d at 450.
Further, Justice Ward observed that the primary beneficiary of the doctrine,
industry, no longer received the fruits of the doctrine. Id. at 201, 239 N.E.2d at
449. He concluded by noting that the comparative negligence system was working well in numerous other jurisdictions. Id. at 201, 239 N.E.2d at 450.
76. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). Alvis was a consolidated case. Id. at 4,
421 N.E.2d at 887. In the title case, Alvis was a passenger in the defendant
Ribar's car when it struck a sign erected by the defendant Milburn Bros., Inc.
Id at 4-5, 421 N.E.2d at 887. Milburn was working as a contractor for the third
defendant, Cook County. Id. at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 887. The plaintiff filed suit
against all three parties. Id. at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 887.
In the other case, the defendant Abbott Laboratories' truck collided with a
car driven by the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 4-5, 421 N.E.2d at 887. The plaintiff, Krohn, brought a wrongful death action against the defendant. Id. at 4-5,
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gence and adopted the latter. 77 After analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of the two predominant systems of comparative negligence, modified 78 and pure, 79 the Alvis court chose the pure form as
the new law for Illinois.80 Therefore, in Illinois, a plaintiff could
recover damages from a defendant proportional to the defendant's
fault. 8 ' In the years immediately following the Alvis decision, a
defendant responsible for the majority of the blame for the injury
could also file a counterclaim and recover damages from the plaintiff in proportion to the plaintiff's fault.8 2 Consequently, a defendant responsible for 90% of the damage could recover from the
83
plaintiff who bore only 10% of the responsibility for the injury.
In 1986, the Illinois General Assembly, as part of the Tort
Reform Act, altered this aspect of the Alvis rule and enacted a
modified form of comparative negligence.8 4 Under the statute, a
plaintiff must satisfy a threshold test by showing that he is not
421 N.E.2d at 887. Both cases included a count based on comparative negligence.
Id. at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 887.
The trial courts in both cases dismissed the comparative negligence counts.
Id. The appellate court affirmed Alvis' dismissal. Id. at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 884.
The Illinois Supreme Court accepted Alvis' appeal and certified Krohn's case
for immediate appeal. 1d. at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 887.
77. Id. at 9-16, 421 N.E.2d at 890-93. The court found the logic and fairness
of comparative negligence "difficult to dispute." Id. at 15, 421 N.E.2d at 892.
The court also noted the wave of transformation occurring around the country
as more states adopted comparative negligence. Id. at 12-13, 421 N.E.2d at 89192.
78. Modified comparative negligence establishes a threshold of liability that
the plaintiff must meet in order to recover. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 67,
at 473. The plaintiff satisfies this threshold requirement by showing that the
defendant's liability for the injury exceeds the statutorily established limit of
50%. Id. Once this requirement is met, then the plaintiff is allowed to recover
damages proportional to the defendant's liability. Id. See, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1991)), for an example of a
modified comparative negligence statute.
79. Pure comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover damages from
the defendant in proportion to the defendant's liability. KEETON ET AL., supra
note 3, § 67, at 472. So long as the plaintiff's conduct is not the sole cause of the
injury, the plaintiff may recover damages from the defendant. See id.
80. Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 25-28, 421 N.E.2d at 896-98. The Alvis court found that
the apportionment of damages under pure comparative negligence best served
the interests of justice. Id. at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 897. The court noted that modified comparative negligence merely shifts the contributory negligence burden
but does not eliminate it. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. In situations where the defendant's damages greatly exceeded the plaintiff's damages, this aspect of the Alvis decision could work grave injustices. To
illustrate, a defendant who was determined to be 90% at fault, but suffered
$400,000 in damages, could prevent any damages from being awarded to a plaintiff who had less than $40,000 in damages, simply by filing a counter suit.
84. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 21116 (1991)).
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more than 50% at fault to recover.8 5 The statute, however, does not
specifically address the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine;
86
thus, the doctrine's status remains unclear.
C. The Willful and Wanton Misconduct Doctrine in Illinois
The doctrine of willful and wanton misconduct, like comparative negligence, arose as a method of reducing the harsh effects of
contributory negligence on plaintiffs8

7

and as a means of deterring

88

potential tort-feasors.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, utilized the doctrine to protect the interests of industry.8 9 The doctrine of willful and wanton misconduct originally appeared in
Chicago & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Patchin where the Court
termed it recklessness. 90 In Patchin, the Illinois Supreme Court
defined recklessness as the deliberate disregard of danger, and held
that a contributorily negligent plaintiff could only recover after
proving that the defendant acted recklessly. 91
Generally, plaintiffs in early cases were limited to showing
recklessness or willful and wanton misconduct, as it came to be
92
called, by proving that a defendant willfully violated a statute.
The cases distinguished willful and wanton misconduct from gross
85. The statute in pertinent part reads as follows: "[T]he plaintiff shall be
barred from recovering damages if the trier of fact finds that the contributory
fault on the part of the plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate cause of the
injury." 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 21116 (1991)).
86. The fact that the statute did not specifically include willful and wanton
misconduct played a major role in Burke. See Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor
Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 441-43, 593 N.E.2d 522, 527-28 (1992). See infra notes 122-30
and accompanying text for a detailed analysis of the court's decision-making
process in Burke.
87. Turk, supra note 20, at 306.
88. Green, supra note 23, at 200. In his article, Dean Green cites several
cases where the court used willful and wanton misconduct as a warning to future wrongdoers. Id., citing e.g., Brown v. Illinois Terminal Co., 319 Ill. 326, 150
N.E. 242 (1925); Walldren Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 Ill. 472, 126 N.E. 97
(1920).
89. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text concerning the influence
of industry on the adoption of contributory negligence; see also Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Godfrey, 71 Ill. 500 (1874).
90. 16 Ill. 197 (1854). This case dealt with the killing of the plaintiff's livestock on several occasions by locomotives. Id. at 198. The stock were considered to be trespassing, however. Id. at 202. The plaintiff's failure to prevent
the trespass by neglecting to secure his stock was the basis for the finding of
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Id.
91. Id. at 204.
92. See, e.g., Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914);
Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott, 181 Ill. 495, 55 N.E. 131 (1899); Catlett et al. v.
Young, 143 Ill. 74, 32 N.E. 447 (1892) (all dealing with the violation of safety
statutes resulting in a finding of willfulness on the defendant's part). But see
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Godfrey, 71 Ill. 500 (1874) (holding that evidence showing a
disregard of local speed ordinances was not controlling and deeming the plain-
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negligence.9 3 Willful and wanton misconduct surpassed gross negligence in culpability because of the foreseeability of harm.94 Therefore, the defense of contributory negligence was not available to a
willful and wanton defendant.9 5 The contributory negligence defense, however, remained available in the majority of cases where
96
the defendant did not violate a safety statute.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff's violation of a safety statute did not
automatically preclude the plaintiff's recovery. In Walldren
Express Co. v. Krug,97 the Illinois Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to recover despite the fact that he violated a safety statute
prohibiting the use of public streets as baseball diamonds. 98 Even
though the plaintiff violated a municipal ordinance, the Krug court
found that the defendant's actions surpassed all degrees of negligence, and ordered recovery for the plaintiff. 99 In its ruling, the
Krug court redefined willful and wanton misconduct making it the
equivalent of gross negligence, thereby widening the scope of the
exception established in the Patchin case.1° ° Willful and wanton
misconduct became firmly ensconced as an exception to contributory negligence.
tiff's presence in an area of danger with only tacit license more determinative
of the matter).
Today, a plaintiff must show not only the violation of a statute, but also
that he was among the class intended to be protected by the statute, that the
statute was intended to prevent the type of injury that he incurred, and that his
injury would not have occurred absent the violation of the statute. Rodgers v.
St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur, 149 Ill. 2d 302, 308, 597 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1992) (quoting Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 574 N.E.2d 602 (1991)).
93. Walldren Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 Ill. 472, 475, 126 N.E. 97, 10001 (1920); Schultz, 264 Ill. at 103, 106 N.E. at 239.
94. Dean Green takes it as a matter of known fact that the two doctrines
were wholly different in Illinois law. Green, supra note 23, at 201. Green
makes his offhand remark about willfulness being outside the three types of
negligence (simple, ordinary, gross) in his discussion on the Godfrey case. Id. at
202. He also points out that the failure to exercise ordinary care will lead some
fact-finders to declare the breach of duty as willful. Id.
95. See, e.g., Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott, 181 Ill. 495, 55 N.E. 131 (1899).
96. Green, supra note 23, at 200-04.
97. 291 Ill. 472, 126 N.E. 97 (1920). In Walidren, the defendant's truck
driver ran down the plaintiff as the plaintiff was playing baseball in the street.
Id. at 474, 126 N.E.at 98. The truck's defective engine regulator failed to slow its
speed. Id. at 475, 126 N.E. at 98. The driver knew that the boys were playing
ball in the street, yet failed to slow down or sound his horn. Id. at 475, 126 N.E.
at 98. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded damages. Id. at 474, 126 N.E.
at 98. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 474, 126 N.E. at 98.
98. Id. at 476, 126 N.E. at 98.
99. Id. at 477, 126 N.E. at 99. The truck driver's failure to stop or give any
warning despite his knowledge of the impending danger constituted willful and
wanton misconduct. Id. at 477, 126 N.E. at 99.
100. Id.
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The status of this exception naturally came into question after
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence. 10 1
However, the Alvis court deferred to the legislature or future decisions on these types of "collateral issues."10 2 In addressing the role
willful and wanton misconduct would play in Illinois law, however,
the legislature enacted only minor procedural changes that made
willful and wanton misconduct counts subject to the judge's
10 3
discretion.
The silence of the Illinois General Assembly and the Illinois
Supreme Court over the proper role willful and wanton misconduct
was to play under comparative negligence spawned two diametrically opposed decisions in the Illinois Appellate Courts. In State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Mendenhall,10 4 the appellate
court allowed a reduction of damages based on plaintiff's fault despite the fact that the trial court found the original wrongdoer willful and wanton.105 The court reasoned that reducing damages in
willful and wanton misconduct cases was proper because the boundaries between willful and wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence were not clear enough to support disparate treatment. 0 6 As
a result, willful and wanton misconduct practically ceased to exist
10 7
because of its transformation into another form of negligence.
In Montag v. Board of Education,0 8 however, the appellate
court reached the opposite conclusion and found that willful and
101. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429,440, 593 N.E.2d 522,
528-29 (1992).
102. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 28, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (1981).
103. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-604.1 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2604.1 (1991)). This statute strictly forbids the inclusion of a count seeking punitive damages in the original complaint. Id. Such a count can only be added
within 30 days after the close of discovery. Id. To file a punitive count, the
plaintiff must establish at a pre-trial hearing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the facts will support such a count. Id. The final decision rests with
the trial judge's discretion. Id.
104. 164 Ill. App. 3d 58, 517 N.E.2d 341 (4th Dist. 1987). The Mendenhall case
is peculiar because of the parties contesting the matter. The defendant was
involved in an auto accident. Id. at 58, 517 N.E.2d at 342. The other party in the
accident was determined to be willful and wanton. Id. at 58, 517 N.E.2d at 342.
However, the defendant was also found to be contributorily negligent. Id. at 58,
517 N.E.2d at 342. The original wrongdoer in the accident was not insured, and
the defendant had to recover from his insurance company. Id. at 342, 517 N.E.2d
at 342. The insurance company sought a declaratory judgment allowing the
company to reduce the award it had to pay to its insured by the insured's proportion of negligence. Id. at 58, 517 N.E.2d at 342.
105. Id. at 58, 517 N.E.2d at 342.
106. Id. at 61, 517 N.E.2d at 343-44.
107. See Burke v. 12 Rothchild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 444-45, 593
N.E.2d 522, 529 (1992).
108. 112 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 446 N.E.2d 299 (3d Dist. 1983). Montag was also
decided in a strange fashion. The plaintiff sued the school board, but could not
show that the board was willful and wanton in its actions. Id,at 1041, 446
N.E.2d at 300. Therefore, the plaintiff argued that after Alvis, willful and wan-
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wanton misconduct still existed as a legal doctrine distinct from
negligence. 1°9 By statute,1 10 the plaintiff in Montag could only recover by proving that the defendant school district acted in a willful
and wanton manner."' Therefore, the plaintiff, in one of several
alternative arguments, proposed that the adoption of contributory
negligence discarded willful and wanton misconduct." 2 The court
rejected the plaintiff's contention that the adoption of contributory
negligence discarded willful and wanton misconduct."l 3 Consequently, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant's conduct exceeded mere negligence and constituted willful and wanton
misconduct to collect full damages from the school. 1 4 As a result
of these decisions, the status of willful and wanton misconduct in
Illinois law remained unclear."15
In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court finally clarified the matter
in Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart." 6 The Burke court held

that willful and wanton misconduct exception still exists in Illinois." 7 Furthermore, the Burke court found that willful and wanton misconduct differs in kind rather than degree from ordinary
negligence. 1 8 As a result, a willful and wanton defendant may not
reduce payment of damages by the percentage of fault attributable
to the plaintiff."l 9 Thus, a willful and wanton defendant must pay
the plaintiff's full damages, despite the presence of contributory
negligence on the plaintiff's 'part.120 As the next section demonstrates, the Burke opinion is fraught with inconsistencies and
plagued by a selective application of precedent and statutory law.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE BURKE DECISION
The Burke decision attempts to remedy a problem that arose
2
due to Illinois' adoption of modified comparative negligence.' '
ton misconduct is no longer recognized as a heightened form of fault in Illinois.
Id. at 1044, 446 N.E.2d at 303.
109. Id. at 1045, 446 N.E.2d at 303.
110. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-108 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 3-108
(1991)).
111. Montag, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 446 N.E.2d at 303.
112. Id. at 1045, 446 N.E.2d at 303.
113. Id. 446 N.E.2d at 303.
114. Id. 446 N.E.2d at 303.
115. See Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 444, 593 N.E.2d
522, 528-29 (1992).
116. 148 Ill. 2d 429, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992).
117. Id. at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
118. Id., 593 N.E.2d at 532.
119. Id., 593 N.E.2d at 532.
120. Id., 593 N.E.2d at 532.
121. See Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 443-44, 593 N.E.2d at 528. Whenever a state
changes from a contributory negligence system to a comparative negligence system, the status of the contributory negligence exceptions such as willful and
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This part explores the Burke decision in two sections. Section A
focuses on the analysis used by the Burke court in reaching its decision. Section B analyzes the court's failure to adequately incorporate the policy objectives of the precedent and statutory language it
relied on and describes the implications of these defects.
A.

An Analysis of the Burke Rationale

In Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart,122 the Illinois Supreme Court relied on principles of statutory construction, prece-

dent, and deterrence to hold that willful and wanton misconduct
differs in kind, rather than degree, from ordinary negligence. 123 As
a result, the court found that under modified comparative negligence, willful and wanton defendants assume total liability for the
124
plaintiff's injury regardless of the degree of the plaintiff's fault.
This section discusses the three factors the Burke court utilized in
reaching its decision.
In analyzing the facts, 125 the Burke court noted that the incident occurred before the legislature enacted modified comparative
negligence. 126 Nevertheless, the court, in an attempt to clarify the
role of willful and wanton misconduct in the law, announced that
its holding applied to present Illinois law. 127 The court noted that
the modified comparative negligence statute made no mention of
willful and wanton misconduct. 28 Applying statutory construction
principles, the court held that the legislature intended willful and
wanton misconduct become unclear.

Jim Hasenfus, Comment, The Role of

Recklessness in American Systems of Comparative Fault, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 399,
403-04 (1982). Hasenfus formulates a method for analyzing the status of willful
and wanton misconduct in comparative fault systems. Id. at 420-21. The analysis focuses on the legislative and common law history of willful and wanton
misconduct, as well as the policy considerations underlying the doctrine's adoption. Id.
122. 148 Ill. 2d 429, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992).
123. Id. at 439-51, 593 N.E.2d at 526-32.
124. Id. at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
125. In Burke, the plaintiff suffered crippling injuries at the hands of the
defendants. Id at 432-34, 593 N.E.2d at 523-24. First, the manager of the liquor
store shoved the plaintiff to the floor in an argument over payment for a case of
cola. Id. at 433-34, 593 N.E.2d at 523-24. The plaintiff tripped and struck a steel
panel on the door, which rendered him unconscious. Id. The store manager
called the police, who further injured the plaintiff by dropping him as they carried him to the paddy wagon. Id. at 434, 593 N.E.2d at 524. For a more detailed
discussion of the facts in the Burke case, see supra note 2.
126. Id. at 440, 593 N.E.2d at 527. The modified comparative negligence statute requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's fault exceeded or equalled his own. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para.
2-1116 (1991)).
127. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 440, 593 N.E.2d at 527.
128. Id. at 442, 593 N.E.2d at 527. The pertinent part of the comparative negligence statute reads as follows: "In all actions... based on negligence or product liability.., the plaintiff shall be barred from recovering damages ...if the
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wanton misconduct to remain separate from and incomparable with
ordinary negligence. 129 In addition, the court relied on a statutory
definition of willful and wanton misconduct in holding that the legislature considered willful and wanton misconduct to be different in
1 30
nature from ordinary negligence.
In addition to statutory construction, the Burke court analyzed
13
conflicting precedent concerning willful and wanton misconduct. '
32
The court noted the predilection in the Illinois Appellate Courts,
133
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
to compare willful and wanton misconduct with negligence. The
Illinois Supreme Court ignored other decisions by these appellate
courts that contradicted this position by refusing to compare the
two types of conduct.' 3 4 The court also analyzed case law from
other jurisdictions to decide the crucial issue of whether willful and
wanton misconduct differs in kind from negligence. 135 After a thorough review of the genesis of willful and wanton misconduct, the
court held that the doctrine acts to preclude reduction of damages
plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury .... ." 735 ILL.
COMP.STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1991)).
129. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 441-42, 593 N.E.2d at 527. The Burke court reasoned
that the legislature deliberately omitted willful and wanton misconduct from
the statute. Id. at 443, 593 N.E.2d at 527. Therefore, to meet the legislative
intent of the statute, the Burke court denied the willful and wanton defendant
the opportunity to reduce damages based on the plaintiff's comparative fault.
Id. at 441-43, 593 N.E.2d at 527-28.
130. Id. at 443, 593 N.E.2d at 528. The Burke court relied on a statutory definition of willful and wanton that described the conduct as intentional, or utterly
indifferent to the consequences of the actions. Id., 593 N.E.2d at 528, citing 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-210 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 1-210 (1991)).
131. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 444-46, 593 N.E.2d at 528-29.
132. E.g., Downing v. United Auto Racing Ass'n, 211 Ill. App. 3d 877, 570
N.E.2d 828 (1st Dist. 1991) (finding that defendant's actions of allowing races to
continue without stewards after being informed of the danger by the plaintiff
constituted willful and wanton misconduct and allowing reduction of damages
in proportion to plaintiff's negligence); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Mendenhall, 164 Ill. App. 3d 58, 517 N.E.2d 341 (4th Dist. 1987) (holding that the
vaguely defined boundaries between willful and wanton misconduct and negligence mandate a comparison of the two types of conduct).
133. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 444, 593 N.E.2d at 529. In examining federal case
law, the Burke court naturally limited its analysis to the federal court decisions
that applied Illinois law. Id. The Burke court analyzed Davis v. United States,
716 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1983) and Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989),
both of which allowed a reduction of damages in proportion to the plaintiff's
degree of negligence, even though the defendant was found to be willful and
wanton.
134. See, e.g. Montag v. Board of Educ., 112 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 446 N.E.2d 299,
303 (3d Dist. 1983). The appellate court in Burke used the Montag approach.
See Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 209 Ill. App. 3d 192, 568 N.E.2d 80 (1st
Dist. 1991).
135. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 444-47, 593 N.E.2d at 529-30. See infra notes 184-208
and accompanying text for a detailed evaluation of the holdings and reasoning
used in a contrary jurisdiction.
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under modified comparative negligence. 13 Therefore, the court
held that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a basis for
13 7
reducing damages caused by a willful and wanton defendant.
The Burke court also relied on principles of deterrence to arrive at this decision. 138 The court noted that Illinois common law
139
defines willful and wanton misconduct as bordering on intent.
While willful and wanton acts lack the requisite state of mind for
intent, the unreasonable risk inflicted by the defendant warrants
imposition of harsher penalties. 140 The court justified the imposition of these penalties by pointing to its traditional role of discouraging reckless conduct in order to protect society. x4' To deter such
dangerous conduct, the Burke court refused to reduce the plaintiff's
142
recovery when the defendant acts wantonly.
Due to this ruling, the willful and wanton defendant's situation
remains the same as it was under contributory negligence. 143 This
is so despite the fact that comparative negligence allows the reduction of damages in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence. 44 The
136. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
137. Id, 593 N.E.2d at 532. The Burke court, however, declined to determine
the outcome when both parties were willful and wanton. Id. at 452, 593 N.E.2d
at 532. By refusing to answer this question, the Burke court reopened an issue
that previous case law had settled. See, e.g., Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill. 2d 192, 537
N.E.2d 267 (1989) (acknowledging that contributory willful and wanton misconduct precludes recovery); Spence v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d
1039, 340 N.E.2d 550 (1st Dist. 1975) (acknowledging that contributory willful
and wanton misconduct precludes recovery).
138. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532. The court analogized the
treatment of willful and wanton misconduct to punitive damages. Id., 593
N.E.2d at 532. Therefore, to warn future wrongdoers, the Burke decision disallowed comparison of willful and wanton misconduct and negligence. Id., 593
N.E.2d at 532.
139. Id. at 448-49, 593 N.E.2d at 531.
140. Id. at 448-52, 593 N.E.2d at 531-32. The Burke decision denies comparison between negligence and willful and wanton misconduct to inflict stiffer consequences on the defendant. Id. at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532. The Burke court
based this decision on its finding that negligence and willful and wanton misconduct differed in kind rather than degree. Id., 593 N.E.2d at 532.
141. Id. at 449, 593 N.E.2d at 531. This approach reflects the court's role in
promoting proper conduct. The Burke court reached its decision by adopting an
intentional tort perspective toward willful and wanton misconduct. Id. at 44950, 593 N.E.2d at 531. One of the bedrock principles of intentional tort law is
that the plaintiff's negligence will not reduce the defendant's responsibility.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 8, at 33-37. The rationale is to impose a heightened degree of responsibility because of the intentional nature of the tortious
conduct. Id. But see Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991) (allowing a
reduction of damages based on the plaintiff's fault in all tort cases and rationalizing that justice would be better served by allowing juries to determine responsibility in each factual situation without judicially-imposed boundaries).
142. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
143. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
mechanics of contributory negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.
144. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 21116 (1991)). As was the case under contributory negligence, the defendant re-
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plaintiff need only show that the defendant's actions constituted
willful and wanton misconduct to recover all of his damages, regardless of his own fault. 14 5 This decision precludes the defendant
from using modified comparative negligence's equitable system of
146
assessing financial responsibility according to fault.
B.

The Flaws in the Burke Decision

The justifications offered in the Burke decision for the willful
and wanton misconduct exception flounder under close scrutiny.
The very principles the court relied on as the basis for its decision
mandate a different outcome. Utilizing an approach based on legislative intent, judicial precedent, and practical application, this section focuses on the potential problems the Burke decision will
create.
In both statutory construction and legal precedent, the Burke
decision lacks support. In Alvis, the court stated that its objective
in adopting comparative negligence was to apportion damages according to the party's relative fault. 147 The use of the word "fault"
encompasses more conduct than the term negligence. 148 It is arguable, therefore, that the use of the broader term denotes the Alvis
court's willingness to include types of conduct other than negligence in its comparison. 149 Furthermore, the language of the modified comparative negligence statute includes the term fault as
well. 1i ° Therefore, the Burke court's analysis ignores critical language from both the statute and the precedent upon which it is
based.
In addition, the Burke decision ignores the legislative design of
distinguishing between different types of conduct and effectively
eradicates the distinction between intent and recklessness.1 5 ' Acmains liable for full damages upon a finding of willful and wanton misconduct.
See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text, discussing the status of willful

and wanton defendants under contributory negligence.
145. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451-52, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
146. Id., 593 N.E.2d at 532.

147. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 25, 421 N.E.2d 886, 897 (1981). Specifically,
the court stated that "[tihe liability of a defendant should not depend on what
damages he sustained but should be determined by the relationship of his fault
to the ultimate damages." Id. at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897.
148. Hasenfus, supra note 121, at 399, n.1. Hasenfus notes that most jurisdictions have embraced the more inclusive term, thereby allowing comparison of
more types of conduct. Id.

149. Id.
150. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 21116 (1991)). The Burke court reasoned that this word choice reflected the decision to include strict liability comparisons with negligence. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 441-43, 593 N.E.2d 522, 527-28 (1992).
151. A determination of intentional or willful misconduct now results in the
same penalty for defendants in both situations. Under either theory, an Illinois
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tions brought in Illinois under intentional tort or willful and wanton theories now have the same status.152 Neither cause of action
allows reduction of damages for contributory negligence, 153 while
punitive damages are available for both. 5 4 Therefore, by interpreting the Tort Reform Act to exclude a comparison of willful and
wanton acts with ordinary negligence, the Burke court eliminated
155
willful and wanton misconduct as a doctrine distinct from intent.
In addition, the Burke court's holding fails to compensate for
the actual application of the doctrine. 156 The Illinois Appellate
Courts in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Mendenhall 157
defendant may be forced to pay punitive damages. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-7.1(c) (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1(c) (1991)) (allowing

the imposition of punitive damages in a civil proceeding after a determination of
criminal guilt for hate crimes); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/16(a) (1993) (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 23, para. 5116(a) (1991)) (imposing punitive damages for intentional

misuse of charitable assets). But see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-109 (1993) (ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-109 (1991)) (prohibiting imposition of punitive damages in malicious prosecution cases arising out of medical malpractice claims).
In addition, neither an intentional tort defendant nor a willful and wanton tort
defendant is able to reduce damages by the proportion of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 450-51, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
152. After Burke, the only distinction is in the defendant's state of mind
prior to the commission of the tort. The willful defendant will have engaged in
actions that are reckless and ignore the extremely likely chance of injury, but
do not rise to the level of intent, KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 34 at 212-14,
while the defendant in an intentional tort, by definition, will have acted with a
desire to injure the plaintiff. Id § 8 at 33-35.
153. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532. See also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1991)) (applying comparative fault only in cases of negligence or strict liability).
154. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-604 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-

604.1 (1991)) (granting the trial court discretion to allow punitive damages in
negligence cases); Cornell v. Langland, 109 Ill. App. 3d 472, 440 N.E.2d 985 (1st
Dist. 1982) (stating that punitive damages are to punish the defendant for past
intentional behavior and deter future intentional acts).
155. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451-52, 593 N.E.2d at 532. The Illinois Appellate
Court in Montag rejected a similar argument regarding willful and wanton misconduct's continued existence under modified comparative negligence. Montag
v. Board of Educ., 112 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 446 N.E.2d 299, 303 (3d Dist. 1983).
Although the Burke decision acknowledged the separate existence of willful
and wanton misconduct, the decision also simultaneously merged the doctrine
of willful and wanton misconduct with intentional conduct. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at
429, 523 N.E.2d at 531.
156. The factual situations in which willful and wanton misconduct have
been found vary greatly in Illinois law. In some cases, actions bordering on
intent are classified as negligence. See, e.g., Booth v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 224 Ill. App. 3d 720, 587 N.E. 2d 9 (3d Dist. 1992) (holding that a landowner
did not act wantonly in allowing uninsulated tires to remain on the premises
despite the occurrence of an indentical accident a few years ealier.) In other
cases, the failure to warn of an obvious danger results in a determination of
willful misconduct. See, e.g., Soucie v. Drago Amusements Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d
348, 495 N.E.2d 997 (1st Dist. 1986) (finding liability existed due to failure to
warn a slightly retarded adult of the danger of an unprotected fan blade).
157. 164 Ill. App. 3d 58, 517 N.E.2d 341 (4th Dist. 1987).
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and Downing v. United Auto Racing Ass'n 158 emphasized the impracticality of distinguishing between willful and wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence. 159 The Burke court rejected these
arguments, but failed to offer any workable definitions of willful
16 0
and wanton misconduct to alleviate the problem.
The Burke court also neglected to analyze the types of conduct
that have been deemed willful and wanton misconduct. 16 1 A cursory reading of Illinois case law demonstrates the wide range of
162
conduct that has earned the willful and wanton misconduct label.
16 3
This variance weakens the Burke court's deterrence argument
because no clear definition of willful and wanton misconduct exists
under Illinois law to send a warning to potential tort-feasors. Furthermore, with the case law so blurred, courts have no clear directives to give juries for determining what conduct constitutes willful
and wanton behavior. 1'
In addition, the Burke court ignored the question of threshold
considerations. The critical aspect of modified comparative negligence is its incorporation of a threshold of liability into the concept
of comparative negligence. 165 The Burke decision, however, offers
no guidance on this aspect of the law. 1 66 Therefore, as a result of
the Burke decision, a plaintiff who would ordinarily be denied recovery for bearing the majority of the blame for the injury can now
recover simply by showing that the defendant was willful and
158. 211 Ill. App. 3d 877, 570 N.E.2d 828 (1st Dist. 1991).
159. Downing, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 897-98, 570 N.E.2d at 842-43; Mendenhall,
164 Ill. App. 3d at 57-58, 517 N.E.2d at 343-44. See inAfra notes 184-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of a jurisdiction concluding that the line between willful and wanton misconduct and negligence is illusory at best.
160. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 445-46, 593 N.E.2d
522, 529 (1992). Instead of providing workable boundaries to define willful and
wanton misconduct, the Burke court used only vague generalities in defining
willful and wanton misconduct. Id. at 450-51, 593 N.E.2d at 531. In light of the
confused precedent in Illinois case law, the Burke court's solution to the status
of willful and wanton misconduct in a comparative negligence system addressed
only half of the problem. The court ignored the more pressing question of exactly what constitutes willful and wanton misconduct.
161. Id. at 449-50, 593 N.E.2d at 531. The Burke decision merely describes
willful and wanton misconduct; it does not provide concrete examples despite
voluminous case law on the subject from which it could have drawn examples.
162. See supra note 156 for cases illustrating the types of conduct Illinois
courts have held to be willful and wanton.
163. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
164. The situation recalls the confusion under the Jacobs and Grimes decisions in early Illinois case law. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the confusion engendered by these two cases.
165. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 67, at 473.
166. The Burke holding does not establish thresholds of liability, and instead
holds that a finding of willful and wanton misconduct absolutely prohibits any
reduction in damages. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451-52, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
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wanton.167
Under the contributory negligence system, this method of allowing an "all or nothing recovery" had merit. 168 The doctrine of
willful and wanton misconduct allowed a slightly negligent plaintiff, otherwise faced with the full financial burden, to recover. 169
When faced with allowing a willful and wanton defendant to escape
liability, or awarding full recovery to the plaintiff, tort law natu170
rally favored the least culpable party.
This method of dealing with willful and wanton misconduct
now seems anachronistic in light of the adoption of comparative
negligence. 171 Illinois adopted comparative negligence for its equitable method of apportioning damages. 172 However, Burke allows
recovery based solely on the actions of one party without giving
consideration to the plaintiff's responsibility.173 Such an unbalanced approach impugns the very rationale behind comparative
174
negligence.
167. Indeed, this was almost the case in Burke. The co-defendant liquor
store's responsibility for the injury surpassed that of both of the other parties.
Id. at 435, 593 N.E.2d at 524. The jury determined that the liquor store's responsibility was 44.2% of the total fault. Id., 593 N.E.2d at 524. This figure is calculated from the figures given in the case as follows: 68% x 65% = .68 x .65 = .442
= 44.2%.

168. Under the contributory negligence system, the plaintiff's negligence
precluded recovery absent a showing of the defendant's willful and wanton misconduct. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 34, at 213.
169. The doctrine sought to punish the defendant and deter future defendants from similar rash actions. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 64 at 462.
170. Although the operation of contributory negligence ignored this aspect
of tort law, the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine upheld this objective in
a limited number of cases. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text for a
full explanation of this phenomenon in tort law.
171. Under comparative negligence, the plaintiff no longer suffers the injustice of bearing the full burden of an injury for which he was only slightly responsible. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 66, at 468-70. Instead, the fact-finder
assesses liability on a case by case basis. Id at 470-71. The plaintiff and defendant incur liability proportionate to their own responsibility for the injury. Id.
172. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). The Illinois Supreme
Court in Alvis adopted the pure form of comparative negligence to facilitate a
just apportionment of damages. Id. at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897. The Illinois
Supreme Court reasoned that the pure form of comparative negligence
"achieves total justice." Id. at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 898. Nonetheless, the Illinois
General Assembly later adopted the modified system. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1991)).
173. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 451, 593 N.E.2d 522,
532 (1992). By ignoring the rationale given in Alvis, equitable apportionment of
damages, the Burke court neglected this key objective in the adoption of comparative negligence.
174. The Alvis court changed Illinois law to comparative negligence in an
effort to establish a system based on responsibility and equity. Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d 1,
29, 421 N.E.2d at 892-95. In its holding, the Burke court completely ignores this
policy of promoting responsibility.
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Furthermore, the doctrine of willful and wanton misconduct
arose as an exception to the unfair workings of contributory negligence, 175 yet the Burke decision creates unfairness. The willful and
wanton defendant's predicament greatly resembles that of the nineteenth century contributorily negligent plaintiff. 176 In both situations, the determination of culpability based on a one-sided analysis
resulted in the imposition of full damages. 177 The Burke court's
rationale that the willful and wanton defendant's actions prevent
reduction of damages based upon the plaintiff's fault contradicts
178
the very reasoning underlying modified comparative negligence.
Furthermore, as the jury verdict in Burke demonstrates, a finding
of willfulness is not always accompanied by a finding of a greater
degree of responsibility on the part of the willful and wanton
17 9
party.

The Burke decision, however, asserts that a finding of willful
misconduct requires the defendant to shoulder the full damages
175. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 65, at 462.
176. See supra notes 17-26 and 41-46, discussing the mechanics of contributory negligence. In both cases, one party's actions determine responsibility
without any regard for the other party's degree of fault. Due to the injustice
inherent in this method, 44 states discarded contributory negligence for comparative negligence. See supra note 37 for a listing of states utilizing comparative negligence. In Burke, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the defendant city
the opportunity to reduce liability, despite the fact that the jury determined the
defendant city to be the least responsible party. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593
N.E.2d at 532.
177. A great amount of criticism rested on the fact that contributory negligence unfairly imposed the full financial responsibility for an injury on a party
who may have contributed only slightly to its causation. See, e.g., Green, supra
note 23, at 36; Prosser, supra note 30, at 469. In rendering its decision, the
Burke court ignored the fact that its classification of willful and wanton misconduct as different in kind from negligence threatens to establish a system that
greatly resembles the unjust system of contributory negligence. See Burke, 148
Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
178. Illinois law establishes a threshold of responsibility of 50%, thereby requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's responsibility for the injury
equalls or surpasses the plaintiff's in order to recover. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1991)). However, the
Burke court ignored this aspect of the law and instead chose to apply the principles of deterrence. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532. But see Sorensen
v. Allred, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (reasoning that deterring potential defendants from willful and wanton misconduct was unlikely due to the
reality of modern society and human nature).
179. The Burke court held that the injury inflicted on the plaintiff was indivisible. Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 438-39, 593 N.E.2d at 525-26. Therefore, it can be
assumed that the court relied on the 68% negligence figure rendered by the
jury. However, the court gave no guidance for future cases where the plaintiff's
responsibility exceeds that of the willful and wanton defendant. See, e.g., Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979) (reversing the trial court's comparison of
fault where the jury found the plaintiff's decedent to be responsible for 55% of
the injury).
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burden regardless of the plaintiff's degree of fault. 180 In arriving at
this decision, the court found that deterrence and punishment outweigh the principles of fairness and responsibility that spawned the
comparative negligence doctrine.1 8' While willful and wanton misconduct deserves stiffer penalties than those imposed by ordinary
negligence, the Burke court exceeded appropriate boundaries by
equating willful and wanton misconduct with intent.18 2 The proper
status of willful and wanton misconduct is between intent and
183
negligence.
III.

ANALYSIS OF A CONTRASTING JURISDICTION

The dilemma over the proper status of willful and wanton misconduct plagues other comparative negligence jurisdictions as well
as Illinois.184 In resolving this debate, other jurisdictions have for180. The court based this holding on the determination that negligent conduct differs in kind, rather than degree, from willful and wanton misconduct.
Burke, 148 Ill. 2d at 451-52, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
181. Id. at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
182. The Burke court effectively eliminated any distinction between willful
and wanton misconduct and intent by establishing the same consequences for
both types of actions. Id. at 451-52, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
183. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 34, at 212.
184. The following list contains statutes and cases concerning the status of
the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine in various states' comparative negligence systems. The listing includes states that equate gross negligence with
willful and wanton misconduct. The jurisdictions allowing a negligent plaintiff
to recover from a willful and wanton defendant in proportion to the defendant's
fault are as follows: Sturm, Ruger and Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979),
aff'd on reh'g, 627 P.2d 204 (Alaska 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), and
rev'd on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Billingsley v. Westrac Co., 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966), later enacted into statutory
law by ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-1763 (Michie 1987); Sorensen v. Allred, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Lira v. Davis, 832 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1992); Geldert v.
State, 649 P.2d 1165 (Haw. 1982); Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 805 P.2d
1223 (Idaho 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-2 (Burns 1986), applied in Beresford v. Starkey, 563 N.E.2d 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
571 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1 (West 1987) (allowing a
comparison of negligence with recklessness); Thompson v. Hodge, 577 So. 2d
1172 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Comer v. Gregory, 365 So. 2d 1212 (Miss. 1978) (reducing plaintiff's damages by comparative negligence in assault and battery case),
see also Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines, 423 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1970); Martel v.
Montana Power Co., 752 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1988), see also Gurnsey v. Conklin Co.,
751 P.2d 151 (Mont. 1988) (allowing a comparison between plaintiff's and defendant's willful and wanton misconduct); Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222
(N.J. 1991) (allowing a comparison in intentional and negligence torts reasoning
that the jury is best equipped to determine comparative fault in all situations);
Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Jordan v. Britton, 515
N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (allowing comparative negligence to apply in
wrongful death action after defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter of plaintiff's decedent); Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D.
Okla. 1980) (interpreting Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute to include
willful and wanton misconduct based on similar interpretation given to Arkansas statute on which it was based); DeYoung v. Fallon, 798 P.2d 1114 (Or. 1990);
Trevino v. Lightning Laydown, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); UTAH
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mulated two distinct approaches.1 85 The great majority of jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to recover a percentage of his damages
based on a comparison of the defendant's willful and wanton misconduct with the plaintiff's contributory negligence. 186 Other jurisdictions, including Illinois, find that willful and wanton misconduct
differs in kind from ordinary negligence, and therefore, do not allow for comparison of the plaintiffs and defendant's conduct and
simply award full damages to a plaintiff injured by a willful and
wanton defendant.18 7 This part explores the rationales used in a
state allowing comparison between willful and wanton misconduct
and negligence to identify the strengths and weaknesses of such a
decision.
The critical question in determining the status of willful and
wanton misconduct under comparative negligence systems is
whether willful and wanton misconduct differs in kind or degree
from ordinary negligence. x8 8 California, the representative jurisdiction in this part, found that it differs only in degree and elected to
compare the two types of conduct in Sorensen v. Allred.189 The SorCODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1992) (applying comparative negligence principles to
negligence "in all of its degrees"); Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962),
see also Tucker v. Marcus, 418 N.W.2d 818 (Wis. 1988) (refusing to award plaintiff compensatory or punitive damages because a majority of the fault resided
with the plaintiff).
The statutes and case law from states finding a difference in kind between
the two types of conduct, and therefore, refusing to reduce a negligent plaintiff's damages when the defendant has acted willfully and wantonly are as follows: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 (1991) (prohibiting comparison of fault
when defendant was willful and wanton), see also Bauer v. Crotty, 805 P.2d 392
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 593
N.E.2d 522 (1992); Menaugh v. Resler Optometry, 799 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1990); Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979); Schellhouse v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 575
N.E.2d 453 (Ohio 1991) (stating, in dicta, that comparative negligence would not
be applied in cases where defendant was willful and wanton); Krivijanski v.
Union R.R., 515 A.2d 933 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d
187 (Wyo. 1979).
185. The difference between the two approaches is that one allows a comparison between negligence and willful and wanton misconduct, whereas the other
classifies willful and wanton misconduct as a different kind of conduct than
negligence and does not reduce damages in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence. For an example of the first approach, see, e.g., Sorensen v. Allred, 169
Cal. Rptr. 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) and iqfra notes 199-208 and accompanying
text. For an example of the "different in kind" approach, see, e.g., Burke v. 12
Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992) and supra notes
121-83 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 184 for a list of the jurisdictions that allow comparison
between the two types of conduct.
187. See supra note 184 for a list of the jurisdictions that differentiate between the two types of conduct.
188. See supra note 140 and accompanying text for a definition of the degreekind distinction and the role it plays in determining the status of willful and
wanton misconduct under comparative negligence.
189. 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). In Sorensen, the plaintiff's car
collided with the defendant's car when attempting a turn. Id. at 443. The crash
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ensen decision is similar to Burke in that it relies on policy and precedent to reach its decision. Like the Burke decision, Sorensen
neglected to allow for factors that were critical to the development
of the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine during the years
of contributory negligence. Specifically, the Sorensen court ignored
the vital role deterrence played during the doctrine's
development.1 90
Like Illinois, California judicially adopted the comparative negligence doctrine. 191 The California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co. 1 9 2 acknowledged that the adoption of comparative negligence brought the status of contributory negligence exceptions,
such as willful and wanton misconduct, into question. 193 The Sorensen court relied on dicta in Li, as well as practical considerations,
in validating comparisons between willful and wanton misconduct
and negligence. 194 In addition, the Sorensen court also relied on the
California Supreme Court's application of comparative negligence
principles to strict liability tort theories in Daly v. General Motors.19 5 Based on these two precedents, the Sorensen court compared the defendant's willful and wanton misconduct to the
plaintiff's negligence and reduced the plaintiff's damages by his de196
gree of fault.
The Sorensen court noted that negligence and willful and waninjured the plaintiff and killed her husband. Id. The evidence showed that the
defendant driver was driving at an excessive speed. Id. at 443-44. The jury
found the defendant guilty of willful and wanton misconduct, and attributed
55% of the fault to him. Id. at 443. The trial court entered judgment for the
plaintiff for full damages. Id. The defendant appealed the trial court's refusal
to reduce damages. Id.
190. See supra note 88 and accompanying text, discussing the influence of
deterrence principles on the development of the willful and wanton misconduct
exception to the contributory negligence defense.
191. Li v. Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
192. Id.
193. Id. The Li court, however, left such matters to future decisions. Id. at
1241.
194. See Sorenson, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 443. The Li court noted that a comprehensive system of comparative fault includes willful and wanton misconduct
within its confines. Li, 532 P.2d 1226.
195. 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978). The Sorensen court saw no reason to include
strict liability claims under comparative negligence, while differentiating willful and wanton misconduct from negligence. Sorensen, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446. It
should be noted that the Illinois General Assembly also intended for modified
comparative negligence to be applied in cases of strict liability. See 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1991)).
196. Sorensen, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 444, citing Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575
P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978). See also UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 33
(1982), reprinted in HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 22:2 at 485 (2d ed.
1987). The court noted that the definition of comparable fault includes recklessness. Sorensen, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45. Therefore, the court reasoned,
comparing willful and wanton misconduct with negligence reflects the national
trend in negligence law exemplified by the Uniform Act. Id. at 445.
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ton misconduct resemble each other.'9 7 In uniquely California
style, the court analogized the comparison of willful and wanton
misconduct to negligence not to "apples and oranges," but rather to
"the comparison of two types of oranges, or at worst oranges and
lemons.' 9 8 Citric metaphors aside, the Sorensen court noted that
willful and wanton misconduct arose as a counter to the harsh operation of contributory negligence.' 99 Therefore, with contributory
negligence now jettisoned, the need for the willful and wanton mis20 0
conduct disappeared as well.

The Sorensen court also addressed the deterrence argument for
20 1
retaining willful and wanton misconduct as a separate doctrine.
Practical considerations, however, precluded the court from validating the deterrence argument. 20 2 Therefore, the Sorensen court removed the distinction between classes of conduct to allow a more
20
precise focus on the actual issue of comparison of fault.

3

The Sorensen court properly interpreted the precedent set
4
However, the court slighted the importance of deterrent policies in willful and wanton misconduct's development. 20 5 By neglecting this critical aspect of negligence law
and wholly eradicating the distinctions between classes of conduct,
the court ignored the policy objectives of willful and wanton misconduct.2 ° 6 The court's characterization of willful and wanton misconduct's deterrent effect as dubious at best is warranted in
situations of absent-mindedness or recklessness. 207 However, the
forth in Li and Daly.20

197. Sorenson, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
198. Id. at 445-46.
199. Id. at 446.
200. In reaching its decision, the Sorensen court applied the maxim, "when
the need for a rule ceases[,] the rule ceases." Id.
201. Id.
202. Sorenson, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The Sorensen court noted that it was
"highly unlikely that people, especially motorists, act with deliberation" when
conducting their affairs. Id.
203. Id. In addition, the Sorensen court noted that the elimination of the
differing classes of conduct would accelerate the fact-finding process by simply
allowing jurors to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each party,
rather than exploring the intricacies of conduct classifications. Id.
204. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text for the rationales and
holdings in these cases.
205. The Sorensen court addressed the issue, but dismissed it as being inconsequential in modern society. Sorensen, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The court noted
that it is highly unlikely that the average person in modern society contemplates the consequences of their potentially negligent actions. Id.
206. Courts adopted the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine to alleviate
the harshness of contributory negligence and to deter egregious defendants
from future similar conduct. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 34, at 213.
207. See id. In these circumstances, the court's theory that no one ponders
the legal consequences of their reckless actions is correct. If a defendant does
give sufficient consideration to his actions, then his conduct is intentional. Id.
§ 8, at 33-35.
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court failed to consider the punitive aspect of the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine, as well as the deterrent effect it has on
torts based on continuing practices or land conditions. 208 Therefore, the Sorensen decision correctly analyzes the objectives of comparative negligence, but fails to assign the proper weight to the
policy objectives of the willful and wanton misconduct doctrine.
Clearly, the situation cries out for a solution employing the deterrent policies outlined in Burke as well as the principles of comparison discussed in Sorensen.
IV.

AN EQUITABLE BLEND OF RATIONALES

The problem with the current state of willful and wanton misconduct under comparative negligence appears rooted in the idea
that the principle of deterrence must either take precedence over or
be subservient to the rationale of liability based upon comparative
fault.20 9 However, a viable solution that remains faithful to both
the equitable principle of modified comparative negligence and the
deterrent rationale of willful and wanton misconduct is mandated
by the present situation of uncertainty and injustice. This section
first outlines a solution by identifying the important features of the
competing systems and then proposes a model statute that incorporates ideas from both systems. Section A reviews the important
ideas of modified comparative negligence as well as the critical aspects of willful and wanton misconduct. Section B blends the rationales in the form of a model statute.
A.

Vital Aspects of Modified Comparative Negligence and
Willful and Wanton Misconduct

The rationale behind modified comparative negligence reflects
the belief that the system promotes justice in a fair and equitable
manner. 2 10 The adoption of modified comparative negligence precludes recovery by the party responsible for the majority of dam208. Cases involving continuing practices or land conditions constitute a significant portion of willful and wanton misconduct cases. See, e.g., Soucie v.
Drago Amusements Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 348, 495 N.E.2d 997 (1st Dist. 1986)
(assessing liability against carnival owner for inadequate warnings on a fan in a
trailer); Drews v. Mason, 29 Ill. App. 2d 269, 172 N.E.2d 383 (3d Dist. 1961) (finding that a daughter's failure to warn her mother of a broomstick laying on the
floor of a house recently gutted by fire constituted willful and wanton
misconduct).
209. This assumption appears in all decisions addressing the status of willful
and wanton misconduct under comparative negligence. See, e.g., Burke v. 12
Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 439-50, 593 N.E.2d 522, 526-32 (1992);
Sorensen v. Allred, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
210. See supra notes 3-4, 36-37 and accompanying text for the rationales used
by courts in deciding to adopt comparative negligence.

1993]

Willful and Wanton Misconduct

age. 2 11 The critical aspect of the rationale lies in preventing unjust
recovery by the party responsible for the majority of the
2 12
damages.
Equitable principles also established the willful and wanton
misconduct doctrine. 2 13 The exception to the harsh rule of contributory negligence serves as both a deterrent and punishment to the
defendant engaging in willful and wanton actions. 214 In addition, a
jury may impose punitive damages on a defendant found to be willful and wanton. 215 Therefore, in addition to alleviating the harshness of contributory negligence, willful and wanton misconduct
sought to promote due care in society by awarding monetary damages to the party harmed by the willful and wanton misconduct.

B.

The Proposal

The status of willful and wanton misconduct remains a mystery
in many United States jurisdictions. In addition, the answers given
by jurisdictions encountering this problem fail to adequately resolve the issue. However, by blending the deterrent and punitive
objectives of willful and wanton misconduct with the equity and
fairness principles of modified comparative negligence, a solution
faithful to both interests appears.
A proper interpretation would incorporate a threshold similar
to the type used in modified comparative negligence to limit recovery. In this way, the law in Illinois would remain true to modified
comparative negligence. However, a threshold of liability does not
mandate the pure comparison of a plaintiff's responsibility with a
defendant's as the court in California chose to proceed in Sorensen.216 A pure comparison of a plaintiff's negligence with a defendant's willful and wanton misconduct negates the deterrent and
211. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text for the mechanics of modified comparative negligence.
212. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text for the operation of modified comparative negligence.
213. See supra notes 9-12, 47-50 and accompanying text for the genesis of the
willful and wanton misconduct exception to the contributory negligence
defense.
214. See supra notes 10, 29-30 and accompanying text, discussing the policy
objectives underlying willful and wanton misconduct.
215. See, e.g., Cornell v. Langland, 109 Ill. App. 3d 472, 440 N.E.2d 985 (1st
Dist. 1982) (holding that the imposition of punitive damages rests with the factfinder and serves to punish the defendant for past conduct and deter future
reckless actions).
216. The Sorensen decision allows comparison of all types of conduct, short
of intent, regardless of the surrounding circumstances. Sorensen v. Allred, 169
Cal. Rptr. 441, 446-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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punitive policies that underlie the willful and wanton doctrine. 217
The consequences of willful and wanton misconduct should remain
stricter than those imposed for negligence. However, the distinction between willful and wanton misconduct and intentional torts
should stay intact as well. Therefore, a willful and wanton defendant should be allowed to reduce liability in certain situations.
The proposed statute 218 blends the rationales of deterrence and
equity in an attempt to resolve the issue of damages in a manner
that is fair to both plaintiffs and defendants. It employs a threshold
standard of recovery, yet still treats willful and wanton misconduct
in a different and stricter manner than negligence. The statute allows a willful and wanton defendant to reduce damages when a
plaintiff's responsibility exceeds the 50% threshold. However, if
the defendant is determined to be responsible for more than 50% of
the damages, then the statute imposes full liability on the defendant. If, for example the defendant were determined to be willful
and wanton, and responsible for 40% of the plaintiff's injuries, then
the defendant would pay 40% of the plaintiff's damages. As a result, the defendant would absorb damages proportional to his fault.
If the fact-finder determines that the defendant was both willful
and wanton and responsible for more than 50% of the injuries, then
the defendant would pay the plaintiff's full damages.
By enacting this statute, the legislature would satisfy the deterrent objectives of willful and wanton misconduct as well as the
principles of equity inherent in modified comparative negligence.
Thus, cases where the willful and wanton defendant contributed
only slightly to the injury would be fairly resolved for both parties.
Furthermore, the proposed statute punishes an act of willful and
wanton misconduct causing a greater proportion of the injury
with the severity it deserves. Therefore, the injustice of forcing a
slightly responsible defendant to shoulder the entire burden would
be eliminated, while the egregious defendant would suffer the just
consequences of his actions.
The holding in the Burke case that willful and wanton misconduct differs in kind from contributory negligence 219 provides further justification for this proposal. The distinction remains viable
under this proposal. This classification mandates stiffer treatment
217. See supra notes 10, 29-30 and accompanying text for the role that the
rationales of deterrence and punishment played in the adoption of willful and
wanton misconduct.
218. See the Appendix to this note for the proposed statute.
219. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, 148 Ill. 2d 429, 450, 593 N.E.2d 522,
532 (1992).
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for willful and wanton defendants.22 0 In addition, willful and wanton misconduct would not merge into intentional tort law as the
Burke court's holding implies. By adopting this proposal, the consequences for different levels of fault such as negligence, intent, and
willful and wanton misconduct remain separate, thereby serving
the interests of both justice and compensation.
In addition, the trial court's discretion in determining the viability of a count charging willful and wanton misconduct remains
intact. The trial court would retain the authority to allow the addi2 21
tion of such a count as the Illinois General Assembly intended.
Therefore, the proposal respects the authority of the trial court in
determining the presence of willful and wanton misconduct.
The proposed statute incorporates a two-step process in determining liability. After the judge determines that enough evidence
exists to warrant the additional charge of willful and wanton misconduct, the fact-finder answers two questions. First, the factfinder determines whether a defendant committed a negligent or a
willful and wanton act. If the fact-finder determines that the defendant acted negligently, rather than in a willful and wanton manner, then modified comparative negligence determines liability.
The second phase of the process occurs if the defendant is
found to be willful and wanton. The fact-finder would then ascertain, under ordinary principles of comparative fault, the level of
responsibility attributable to each party. If the defendant's responsibility surpasses the 50% threshold, then he must pay the plainOtherwise, the defendant would only be
tiff's full damages.
responsible for a percentage of the damages, equal to the amount of
his fault as determined by the fact-finder. In this manner, the willful and wanton defendant suffers harsher consequences than a negligent defendant, but is not subjected to a disproportionate amount
of liability. In addition, the plaintiff in a willful and wanton case
does not receive a windfall recovery that ignores his responsibility.
As a result, the proposed statute prevents injustice reminiscent of
contributory negligence while it deters future tort-feasors from
egregious behavior.
CONCLUSION

The objectives of modified comparative negligence are to equitably apportion fault according to responsibility. Current Illinois
220. After determining that willful and wanton misconduct differed in kind
from negligence, the Burke court established stiffer consequences for the will-

ful and wanton defendant. Id. at 451, 593 N.E.2d at 532.
221. Illinois law mandates that the trial judge exercise this discretion in allowing plaintiffs to add willful and wanton counts. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2604.1 (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-604.1 (1991)).
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law defeats this objective by allowing windfall recoveries to contributorily negligent plaintiffs injured by willful and wanton defendants. Furthermore, the doctrine of willful and wanton misconduct
arose to deter and punish defendants for their heightened degree of
responsibility. Illinois law meets this objective, but deals with the
willful and wanton defendant too harshly. By adopting the proposed statute, the objectives of both doctrines would be satisfied in a
fair and equitable manner for all parties.
Dan Groth, Jr.

1993]

WilUful and Wanton Misconduct
APPENDIX

Proposed Willful and Wanton Misconduct Statute
§ 5/2-1116.1. Treatment of Willful and Wanton Misconduct.
1. All actions filed on or after June 1, 1993 that allege willful and
wanton misconduct against any person, corporation, association,
partnership, or governmental entity in compliance with paragraph
2-604.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure shall present two preliminary questions for the finder of fact:
(a) Whether the party alleging willful and wanton misconduct has
shown that the opposing party acted in a willful and wanton manner,
and
(b) What percentage of the harm was caused by the opposing party's
actions.
2. If the party alleging willful and wanton misconduct fails to
prove to the finder of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the opposing party acted willfully and wantonly, then the apportionment of fault shall be determined under paragraph 2-1116 of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. If the finder of fact determines
that the party bringing the allegation has proved the existence of
willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the opposing party
and that the willful and wanton misconduct proximately caused
50% or more of the injury or harm, then the court shall award the
full damages sustained by the party alleging willful and wanton
misconduct. If the fact-finder determines that the willful and wanton misconduct proximately caused less than 50% of the harm or
injury, then the party alleging willful and wanton misconduct shall
be awarded monetary damages in proportion to the percentage of
causation attributed to the opposing party determined by the factfinder.
3. No part of this statute shall be construed to interfere with the
assessment of punitive damages.

